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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in granting URTs1 motion to dismiss? 
]The reference to "URT throughout this brief shall mean collectively Utah Resources 
International, Inc., Tonaquint, Inc., Resources Limited Partnership, Tonaquint Indian Hills 
Limited Partnership, Country Club Partnership, Southgate Plaza Limited Partnership, Southgate 
Palms Limited Partnership, Southgate Resort Limited Partnership and Service Station Limited 
Partnership #2 unless specified otherwise. The reference to "URT does not include John H. 
1 
2. Did the trial court err in granting URI's motion to strike? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate court 
must accept the material allegations of the complaint as true, and the trial court's ruling should be 
affirmed only if it clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his or 
her claims." Hansen v. Department of Financial Institutions. 858 P.2d 184, 185-86 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Defendants are unable to find a Utah appellate decision which addresses the 
standard of review regarding a trial court's ruling on motions to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A ruling to strike scandalous or immaterial allegations 
pursuant to Rule 12(f) is analagous to evidentiary rulings. An appellate court will not reverse a 
trial court's evidentiary ruling unless the trial court has abused its descretion. State v. Larsen. 
775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989). "[T]he error must have been harmful" to constitute an abuse of 
discretion. Id. That standard should apply to rulings regarding Rule 12(f) motions. 
FACTS 
The story told by plaintiffs eighty-five page Complaint began nearly thirty-five 
years ago.2 Only one party to the Complaint was involved in the beginning, a defendant, John H. 
Morgan, Jr. and Daisy Morgan who are represented by other legal counsel. 
2The Complaint alleges several transactions which occurred more than twenty years ago 
and to which plaintiff was not a party. The Complaint is merely plaintiffs guess at what 
transpired and what the various parties intended, most of whom are now dead. URI relies on the 
facts, as alleged in the Complaint, because those facts must be taken as true in addressing a 
motion to dismiss. URI's reliance on those facts should not be interpreted to mean it agrees. 
2 
Morgan, Jr. ("Morgan"). In January 1961, Morgan, Morgan Gas & Oil Co., Justheim Petroleum 
Co., Clarence I. Justheim, John H. Morgan, Sr., International Uranium, Inc. (collectively the 
"Salt Lake Group") and B & E Securities, Inc. ("B&E"), plaintiffs predecessor, executed a 
written instrument titled the "Syndicate Agreement." R. 6, 87 ffi[ 14-15. 
According to the Complaint, each party to the Syndicate Agreement contributed 
cash to purchase land. Id. HH 15, 17. The Syndicate's profits were to be divided "pro rata among 
the syndicate members as their proportionate unit interest is to the whole." R. 7, 87 ^  18. The 
Syndicate Agreement designated Morgan as "manager." Id. % 24. 
In July 1961, the Salt Lake Group executed a written instrument titled 
"Amendment to Syndicate Agreement" (the "Amendment"). R. 7, 88 f^ 21. The Amendment 
expressed some kind of limitation of liability for the Syndicate's debts and named the Syndicate 
S.W. Associates. It reaffirmed Morgan as "manager" and modified his compensation. Id. B&E 
did not execute the Amendment. R. 7, 88 ^ 23. 
The Complaint alleges Morgan began acquiring land in 1961 and continued to 
acquire land after that for the benefit of S.W. Associates. R. 8 ffl| 27, 29. Plaintiff attached to the 
Complaint a list of real property allegedly purchased by Morgan for the benefit of S.W. 
Associates. R. 8, 89-91 ffl[ 27, 29. 
In 1966, URI's predecessor was formed. R. 8 T[ 30. In March 1970, the Salt Lake 
Group received shares of stock in URI in exchange for their interest in S.W. Associates. R. 91f 
32. Thus, after March 1970, the Salt Lake Group no longer possessed an interest in S.W. 
Associates. Id. 135. The Salt Lake Group were merely shareholders of URI. Id. B&E did not 
participate in the transaction. Id. Apparently, B&E retained its interest in S.W. Associates. 
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According to the Complaint, no land was transferred to URI when this transaction occurred. Id. 
TJ 33. Thus, at the time of this transaction, S.W. Associates retained its interest in land and B&E 
was the only remaining member in the Syndicate. 
In December 1972, Morgan signed an untitled document which plaintiff calls a 
"Certificate." R. 10, 1021J 40. Morgan signed as "manager." The document states B&E owns 
48,199 units in S.W. Associates. Id. 
Tonaquint's predecessor was formed in June 1970. R. 9 ^ 36. According to the 
Complaint, all land acquired for the benefit of S.W. Associates was conveyed to Tonaquint's 
predecessor by 1973. R. 9-10, 11 ffif 37-38, 42. In August 1973, B&E, the only remaining 
member in S.W. Associates, and Tonaquint's predecessor signed a written instrument titled 
"Disclaimer of Interest in Real Property" (the "Disclaimer"). R. 11, 92-101 If 42. The Complaint 
alleges B&E gave up "any and all right, title and interest in and to" the land transferred to 
Tonaquint's predecessor pursuant to the Disclaimer. R. 12, 92 Tf 50. 
In May 1975, B&E assigned the Certificate to American Holding Co. R. 12 U 51. 
Then, American Holding Co. assigned the Certificate to plaintiff, id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Based on the alleged facts, plaintiff asked the trial court to find one of six possible 
legal relationships between it and URI: an express trust, an implied trust, a limited partnership,3 
a general partnership, a security or a contract. Assuming one of those legal relationships could 
3The third cause of action asserted a limited partnership. R. 43-45. URI also moved to 
dismiss that claim in the trial court. R. 132. In its brief, plaintiff has not challenged the trial 
court's dismissal of the limited partnership claim. Thus, plaintiff has waived that claim. Pixton 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.. 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
4 
be applied, plaintiff then alleged a breach of the relationship: breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract or mismanagement. Plaintiff also asserts a right to an accounting (spanning more than 
thirty-five years and involving nine entities), to dissolution and to remove URI as a fiduciary. 
Plaintiff also asserts claims for unjust enrichment, fraud, injunctive relief, disregard of the 
corporate entity and the appointment of a receiver. URI moved to dismiss plaintiffs Complaint 
with prejudice and to strike certain scandalous and immaterial allegations. The trial court 
granted URTs motions. The trial court's decision was correct and should be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs Complaint is barred by laches. Laches applies if plaintiff has failed to 
diligently pursue its claims and if plaintiff s delay has injured URI. Both elements are present. 
Plaintiffs claim arises out of a relationship created in 1961, nearly thirty-five years ago. Fifteen 
years later, in 1975, plaintiff acquired an assignment relating to that relationship from another 
assignee. Plaintiff knew then sufficient facts, and had access to other information, to at least 
prompt an inquiry. For twenty years plaintiff did nothing, while URI invested significant time, 
assets and effort in developing the land. In 1993, plaintiff finally sought an accounting and 
damages spanning thirty-five years claiming it was entitled to "millions of dollars." Over the 
thirty-five period, significant changes occurred. Land has been sold, exchanged, repurchased and 
resold. All but one of the original parties have died or cease to exist. Evidence has been lost. 
Plaintiffs Complaint is also barred by various statutes of limitation. The 
underlying claim of plaintiff s 1st, 2d, 4th and 11th causes of action is defendants breached the 
written trust, partnership or contract. Assuming the applicability of a discovery rule, the six year 
limitations period began to run when the breach was actually known or could have been known 
through reasonable diligence. Plaintiff should have acted within at least three or four years after 
5 
1975. Thus, the limitation period began to run by at least 1978 or 1979. Assuming a partnership 
was created, plaintiffs right to an accounting accrued when the partnership dissolved. The 
alleged partnership dissolved in 1975. Plaintiffs fraud claim is barred by Section 78-12-26(3). 
According to the Complaint, the alleged concealment first occurred in 1975 and the alleged 
affirmative misrepresentations occurred by at least 1981. The constructive trust is barred by 
section 78-12-25(3). The limitation period began to run when plaintiff should have discovered 
the wrongful act which gave rise to the constructive trust. The wrongful act occurred in 1975. 
Plaintiffs remaining claims are barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992). Assuming the 
applicability of a discovery rule, plaintiff should have asserted its remaining claims within four 
years after 1978 or 1979. 
Plaintiff asserts URI should be estopped from asserting laches and limitations. 
Plaintiff does not allege it relied on any affirmative misrepresentations made by URI. Thus, 
before plaintiff can assert estoppel, it must show it diligently investigated its claims. It cannot 
make that threshold showing. In addition, URJ did nothing to induce plaintiffs delay in pursuing 
its claims. 
Plaintiff asserts URI acknowledged an obligation to plaintiff. Acknowledgments 
must be made to the creditor. Statements made to strangers are not acknowledgments. The only 
documents on which plaintiff relies were not given to plaintiff. Plaintiff obtained them from 
third-party sources. In addition, the statements are not an unequivocal admission of an 
obligation. At most, they provide a historical recitation of URI's business and they directly deny 
any debt. 
Plaintiff acquired an interest in a defunct entity only. A Certificate representing 
6 
ownership in an entity known as S.W. Associates was assigned to plaintiff. When plantiff 
received its assignment, S.W. Associates had no assets, no business purpose and no members 
except the original assignor. S.W. Associates was defunct and plaintiffs assignment was a 
nullity. 
There is no express trust. The Disclaimer does not express any intent to create a 
trust, nor does it identify a trustee or the beneficiaries. The Disclaimer does not express URI's 
consent to act as trustee which is mandatory and there is no res. There is no resulting trust or 
constructive trust because plaintiffs predecessor gave up its interest in the alleged res through the 
Disclaimer before plaintiff received its assignnent. 
There is no general partnership. URI was not a party to the alleged partnership. It 
was never substituted as a partner. In addition, URI did not carry on a business for profits as a 
co-owner with plaintiff or its predecessor. Plaintiff did not have joint control over the alleged 
partnership's assets. The Complaint alleges Tonaquint, URI's subsidiary, had exclusive control 
over the land and its disposition. Furthermore, if there was such a partnership, plaintiff was 
merely an assignee, not a partner and any alleged partnership dissolved in 1975. 
Pusuant to Rule 9(b), plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity. Plaintiff 
failed to specify to whom defendants made statements or from whom they withheld facts. 
Plaintiff also failed to allege the statements were false, how they were false and how any 
statements or omissions were material. Plantiff also failed to state a claim for fraud. Plaintiff 
failed to, and cannot allege the statements were made to induce plaintiff, that plaintiff was 
induced and that the statements were knowingly or recklessly false. 
The Disclaimer forms the basis of the alleged contract, trusts and partnership. To 
7 
enforce either relationship, the terms of the respective relationship must be definite. Among 
other things, the Disclaimer does not define "profits." 
When a relationship involving partners becomes adversarial and the partners deal 
at arm's length, their fiduciary duties to one another may be extinguished. Further, the partners' 
fiduciary relationship terminates when the partnership dissolves. The alleged partnership 
dissolved in 1975. 
Plaintiffs Complaint refers to two lawsuits involving some of the defendants. 
Those lawsuits are wholly unrelated to plaintiffs claim. In addition, the allegations misstate the 
rulings of one of the lawsuits. The statements were properly stricken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF SLEPT AND IS NOW TOO LATE 
Plaintiffs Complaint is eighty-five pages, excluding its attachments. It names 
eleven defendants and asserts twenty causes of action based on numerous, complicated events 
spanning nearly thirty-five years. The Complaint serves only to emphasize the parties' present 
lack of knowledge, information and understanding regarding relationships allegedly created 
decades ago. Plaintiffs Complaint is a classic example of the perils of waiting too long to bring 
a cause of action. Original participants die, memories dim and information is lost. Plaintiffs 
failure to act timely on its claim creates a serious injustice. 
Plaintiffs claim arises out of a relationship which started in 1961, and in which 
plaintiff was not involved. Fifteen years later, and after several significant changes in the 
original relationship, plaintiff acquired an assignment of something from another assignee. For 
8 
another twenty years, while URJ invested significant time, assets and effort in developing land in 
St. George, plaintiff waited and watched without making any contribution or taking any risk. 
Now, plaintiff says it is entitled to "millions of dollars." The United States Supreme Court, 
many years ago, aptly described URTs position: 
Under such circumstances, where property has been developed by the courage and 
energy and at the expense of the defendants, courts will look with disfavor upon 
the claims of those who have lain idle while awaiting the results of this 
development, and will require not only clear proof of fraud, but prompt assertion 
of plaintiffs rights. 
. . . The injustice, therefore, is obvious of permitting one holding the right 
to assert an ownership in such property to voluntarily await the event, and then 
decide, when the danger which is over has been at the risk of another, to come in 
and share the profit. 
Johnston v. Standard Mining Co.. 148 U.S. 360, 371 (1892). The trial court correctly barred 
plaintiffs Complaint because of laches and statutes of limitation.4 
A. PLAINTIFF KNEW ENOUGH. BUT FAILED TO DILIGENTLY PURSUE ITS 
CLAIM. 
Plaintiff tries to divert the court's attention by asserting primarily two defenses to 
URTs laches and limitations challenge. One of those defenses invokes the discovery rule.5 
Before a plaintiff can rely on any version of the discovery rule, a "plaintiff must make a threshold 
4In the trial court, URI challenged plaintiffs entire Complaint because it was untimely. In 
addition, URI challenged individual claims on other specific bases. Because URTs laches and 
limitations defenses dispose of plaintiff s entire Complaint, URI will focus primarily on those 
issues in this brief. 
5Plaintiff argues URJ should be estopped from asserting laches or limitations because it 
misled plaintiff or concealed facts from it. Appellant's Brief, at 18-21. That alleged estoppel is 
one version of the discovery rule. Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 
1992). 
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showing that he or she did not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of a 
cause of action." O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991). The 
plaintiffs lack of diligence is also the first element of laches. Leaver v. Grose. 610 P.2d 1262, 
1264 (Utah 1980). 
1. Plaintiff Knew More Than It Wants To Admit. Plaintiff contends it knew 
only that property was being sold and developed, nothing more. Appellant's Brief, at 16. Not so. 
Paragraph 51 of the Complaint alleges plaintiff knew in 1975 it had acquired from B&E an 
assignment of the B&E Certificate in S.W. Associates. R. 11. Based on the allegations of the 
Complaint and its exhibits, plaintiff apparently knew about or possessed in 1975 the Syndicate 
Agreement, the Amended Syndicate Agreement and the Disclaimer. Based on those documents, 
plaintiff knew in 1975 the facts alleged in paragraphs 14-15, 17-27, 29, 40-50. R. 6-8, 9-12. 
Paragraph 52 of the Complaint further alleges "Morgan, Jr., as President" of Tonaquint's 
predecessor, acknowledged plaintiffs interest in 1975. R. 11. Thus, plaintiff knew from 1975 on 
where to obtain additional information. Based on the Complaint's allegations, and its exhibits, 
plaintiff knew in 1975 it claimed an interest in the profits to be derived from land held, 
developed and sold by Tonaquint. R. 6-12, 87-102. As indicated, plaintiff admits it knew land 
in St. George was being developed and sold. That admission is understandable. The 
development of the Hilton Hotel, the townhomes, the convenience store and service station, the 
athletic club and other developments on the 906 acres was obvious. The development, sale and 
exchange of land occurred from 1970 on. R. 32-39 ^ 99. Plaintiff also knew from 1975 on URI 
had not distributed any profits and had not provided any accounting to it. R. 18, 39 fflf 75, 104. 
10 
2. Plaintiff Had Access To Other Information Which Tt Failed To 
Investigate. Plaintiff also contends other ,f[d]etails and facts beyond [the sale and development 
of property] were in the exclusive control of defendants." Appellant's Brief, at 16 (emphasis 
added). Also not true. Other facts were available to plaintiff on an on-going basis for twenty 
years. Its failure to investigate from 1975 until now is no one's fault but plaintiffs. The real 
property records, publicly recorded in Washington County, revealed URI was selling, developing 
and exchanging land. R. 32 f 94. The county records reflected the names of parties involved in 
the property transactions, and in some cases, the sale prices or values assigned to the land. R. 32-
39 f 99. URI did not control those records. They were available to plaintiff from at least 1970 
on. If plaintiff had investigated those records, it would have known most, if not all, the facts 
alleged in paragraphs 27, 29, 37-39, 42-50, 82, 87, 92, 94-95, 98-99 of the Complaint. R. 8-12, 
19-25, 26, 31-39. The Forms 10-K, publicly filed with the S.E.C., revealed the values, prices and 
costs associated with the land developed, sold and exchanged from at least 1978 on. R. 19-25 ^ 
82-84. URI did not control those records. They were available to plaintiff from at least 1981 on. 
If plaintiff had investigated those records, it would have discovered most, if not all, the 
additional facts alleged in paragraphs 30-34, 36, 39, 53-59, 63-69, 71-73, 81-84, 86-89, 99, 101 
of the Complaint. R. 8-10, 12-14, 15-16, 17-18, 19-25, 26-31, 32-39.6 If plaintiff had 
investigated the county records and Forms 10-K, as it should have, it would have discovered the 
6Even the lawsuits, which plaintiff says finally prompted its inquiry in 1993 were 
available to plaintiff since 1987 and 1984 respectively. The derivative lawsuit was not sealed 
until 1993 and the CEC lawsuit has never been sealed. Those lawsuits were reported in every 
Form 10-K filed after the suits were commenced. 
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facts and reached the conclusions alleged in paragraphs 55, 77, 79, 80, 85-86, 90-94, 100, 103, 
105 of the Complaint. R. 13, 19, 26, 31-32, 39-40. 
Plaintiff asserts "laches cannot be imputed to one who was ignorant of the 
facts . . . ." Appellant's Brief, at 17. Plaintiff, however, cannot wait for the facts to knock on its 
door. "[A] reasonably prudent person is required to pursue his claim with diligence." Daugherty 
v. Farmers Cooperative Assoc. 689 P.2d 947, 951 (Okla. 1984). Furthermore, plaintiff cannot 
ignore information which was available to it. "A plaintiff is held to . . . knowledge that could 
reasonably be discovered through investigation of sources open to her." Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 
44 Cal.3d 1103, 1109, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661, 751 P.2d 923, 927 (Cal. 1988). 
Properly limited, a discovery rule should encompass the precept that acquisition 
of sufficient information which, if pursued, would lead to the true condition of 
things will be held as sufficient knowledge to start the running of the statute of 
limitations. . . . Statutes of limitation were not designed to help those who 
negligently refrain from prosecuting inquiries plainly suggested by the facts. A 
plaintiff is chargeable with knowledge of facts which he ought to have discovered 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence.... 
Daugherty. 689 P.2d at 950-51 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Plaintiff alleged in 
paragraphs 55, 75-77, 79, 86, 92-94 of the Complaint, and reasserted in its Opposing Memo,7 
that its claim was based on its deductions and inferences drawn from the Forms 10-K and the 
county records. R. 13, 18-19, 26, 31-32, 177. Plaintiff suggested it could not draw those 
inferences until now because it did not know URTs stock was publicly traded. R. 177. If it had 
known, plaintiff reasons it could have "sought out copies of the 10-Ks which its counsel 
7The reference to Opposing Memo throughout this brief shall mean plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, R. 170-
220. 
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eventually located prior to initiating this action."8 R. 177. There is no question plaintiff knew 
where to obtain any information it wanted. Plaintiff communicated with Morgan in 1975. R. 11 
*f 52. Plaintiff could have obtained from Morgan any information on which it now relies. 
Plaintiff does not explain why it did not ask. 
Several cases illustrate plaintiffs duty to inquire and the consequences for failing 
to do so. In Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese. 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983), a defendant 
counterclaimed alleging conversion of an invention. The defendant knew a patent had issued, 
but he did not know the patent named his supervisor as the sole inventor. Id. at 1256. The 
defendant, however, obviously had access to the patent which was on public record. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated: "[D]ue diligence on his part would have unearthed the inventor . . . as 
shown on the face of the patent." Id. at 1257. Thus, the court held the defendant "cannot now be 
heard to say he had no notice or knowledge of the patent and its contents . . . ." Id. Like the 
defendant in Becton. plaintiff had access to public records which would have "unearthed" its 
claim. 
In Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992), the plaintiffs counsel 
made an unspecified number of phone calls to the airport manager to obtain information 
regarding a flying club's insurance. Id. at 1128. The calls were not returned. Plaintiff later sued 
Provo City for not enforcing an ordinance requiring the flying club to file a certificate of 
insurance. The plaintiff argued the discovery rule applied because "he did not have reasonable 
grounds to believe that Provo was not enforcing its ordinances." Id. at 1128. The Utah Supreme 
8Plaintiff does not provide a similar excuse for failing to research the county records. In 
fact, plaintiff provides no excuse for not finding and reviewing the county records before 1993. 
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Court noted other than making the calls to the airport, the plaintiff made no further inquiry. Id. at 
1129. Thus, the court held plaintiff failed to demonstrate "that he undertook reasonable steps to 
investigate Provo's liability." Id. Like the plaintiff in Warren, plaintiff knew where to obtain 
information, but failed to take reasonable steps to investigate. 
In Condos v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co.. 93 Ariz. 143, 379 P.2d 129 
(1963), the plaintiff sued for fraud involving two life insurance policies. Id. at 130. The plaintiff 
argued he did not discover the fraud earlier because he could not read. The court noted he never 
asked anyone to read the policies to him. The court held the plaintiff "could and should have 
informed himself about the terms and conditions of the policies." Id. at 131. Like the plaintiff in 
Condos. plaintiff "could and should have informed" itself by asking Morgan, and investigating 
the public records on which it now relies. See also. Lord v. Shaw. 665 P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Utah 
1983)(plaintiff had access to courts to seek change in law and could not wait for others to change 
law); First Western Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Home Savings and Loan Assoc. 84 N.M. 72, 
499 P.2d 694, 696 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972)(plaintiff knew it was not receiving payments under loan 
servicing agreement, but plaintiff did not take any action to compel performance). 
One might excuse plaintiffs failure to inquire for a reasonable period of time. 
However, plaintiff cannot put its head in the sand and ignore obvious signs that its rights have 
been violated or ignored for twenty years. Benson v. Pyfer. 783 P.2d 923, 926 (Mont. 1989)(the 
lack of agreed improvements was obvious). Since 1975, plaintiff knew where to obtain 
additional information. Since 1975, plaintiff knew, or had access to, the same information on 
which it now relies. At some point, a reasonable person knowing what plaintiff knew, or had 
access to, would at least ask about the lack of profit distributions and accountings. Plaintiff had a 
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duty to act and it did not within a reasonable time period. 
3. What Plaintiff Allegedly Did Not Know Is A Red Herring. To divert the 
court's attention, plaintiff evades what it knew since 1975 and focuses only on what it allegedly 
did not know. Plaintiff claims it did not know (1) the information contained in a February 22, 
1993 article in the Enterprise and (2) URI was denying plaintiffs claim until Morgan's 1993 
letter. Appellant's Brief, at 16-17. The Enterprise article describes a shareholders' derivative 
action against URI's former directors and its outcome. R. 246-47. The lawsuit was wholly 
unrelated to plaintiffs claim and does not refer to plaintiffs alleged interest. Other than an 
unfounded guilt by association, plaintiff fails to explain how the article suddenly prompted its 
inquiry. Even assuming plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the lawsuit, the court's 
records were available to plaintiff. Supra, at 11, n. 6. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Morgan's 1993 letter is misplaced. Morgan's 1993 letter 
merely confirmed what plaintiff had known for twenty years, i.e., that no profits had been 
distributed and no accounting had been provided. In addition, Morgan's letter was in response to 
plaintiffs inquiry. It did not prompt plaintiffs inquiry. Appellant's Brief, at 16 
B. PLAINTIFF RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED TRUSTfS 
BREACH. 
Plaintiff argues the defenses of laches and limitations do not apply because the 
alleged trust must be "openly repudiated." Appellant's Brief, at 25. Plaintiff relies on Walker v. 
Walker. 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d 253 (1965). Plaintiffs emphasis on the term "open 
repudiation" implies actual notice of the repudiation must be given. Not so. Even plaintiffs 
case, Walker, expressly permits constructive notice. A laches and limitation "defense is not 
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available . . . unt i l . . . the circumstances are such that they must be charged with knowledge of 
such repudiation." Id. at 257 (emphsis added). 
Leggroan v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co.. 120 Utah 93, 232 P.2d 746 (1951) 
is directly on point. In Leggroan. the Utah Supreme Court applied laches and limitations 
defenses to a situation nearly identical to that alleged by plaintiff. Samuel Chambers created a 
trust naming Zion's trustee. Id. at 747. After Chambers' death in 1929, Zion's made three 
distributions respectively in 1929, 1931 and 1935. Id. at 747-48. The trustee did not send any 
statement to the beneficiaries which expressly notified them that further payments would not be 
made. The trustee simply stopped making distributions after 1935. The beneficiaries waited ten 
years to ask why. In 1945, the beneficiaries filed an action seeking an accounting of the trust and 
distribution. Zion's asserted laches and limitations defenses. The Utah Supreme Court held the 
beneficiaries were at least six years too late. Id. at 750. 
In applying those defenses, the court first determined when laches and the 
applicable limitations period started to run. 
If the trustee gives the cestui actual notice of the date of final distribution 
limitations or laches begin at that point. If, however, as in the present case, no 
actual notice is proven then the court must determine when the cestui acquired 
constructive notice of final distribution, and limitations and/or laches start to run 
from that time. 
Id- at 749. The court held laches and limitations began to run a reasonable time after 1935, when 
the last distribution occurred. Id. at 750. The court stated it was unreasonable to wait to act until 
three or four years after the last distribution. 
Further payments after 1935 could justifiably have been anticipated by the cestui 
but a reasonable time after 1935 such hopes should have vanished and limitations 
started to run. How long a time this reasonable period extended beyond 1935 can 
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be determined by looking at the circumstances. The fact that the payments 
became successively smaller and further apart should have lead the cestuis as 
reasonable men to think that the trust estate was almost entirely gone. As the 
years piled up and no other money was forthcoming the beneficiaries must be held 
to have acquired notice of the final ending of the trustee's duties. We do not say 
just how many years after 1935 this constructive notice came to the cestuis, but 
we do say that to have waited three or four years after the last known payment in 
1935 without demanding an accounting or statement from the trustee-bank was 
unreasonable. The passage of six years after constructive notice thus bars this 
action either by laches or statutes of limitations. 
Id. (emphasis added). In this case, plaintiff waited, not three or four years, but nearly twenty 
years without any distributions or accountings before it demanded an accounting. 
Plaintiff tries to twist Leggroan to support its contention. Plaintiff relies on the 
statement in Leggroan that '"[e]ach successive payment would hold the running of the reasonable 
time period because the Cestui might reasonably anticipate further payments.'" Appellant's Brief, 
at 16, 25. Then, plaintiff contends it "reasonably anticipated payments" because there has been 
no "initial distribution," "continuing distribution" and "final distribution." Id. Plaintiffs reliance 
on the lack of distributions is misplaced. In Leggroan. plaintiff aptly explains, it was the receipt 
of a distribution which created the expectation of future distributions. The creation of that 
expectation tolled the limitations period. If the third distribution had not been made in 1935, the 
limitation would have started to run three or four years after 1931, the time of the second 
distribution. If the second distribution had not been made, the limitation would have started to 
run three or four years after 1929, the time of the first distribution, and so forth. The absence of a 
distribution year after year, for twenty years, does not create an expectation of future 
distributions. After a reasonable period of time, it should prompt a reasonable person to ask 
why. According to Leggroan. the absence of any distribution should have at least prompted 
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plaintiff to ask for an accounting within three or four years after 1975, especially considering the 
absence of any distributions made to B&E from 1961 to 1975. Giving plaintiff the benefit of the 
doubt, it should have asked within at least a ten year period. That is more than the Utah Supreme 
Court allowed in Leggroan. 
Plaintiff also contends it reasonably anticipated payments because URI 
"continually reaffirmed" its obligation. Appellant's Brief, at 16, 25. Plaintiffs contention 
implies URI made the alleged reaffirmation to plaintiff, and that reaffirmation created plaintiffs 
expectation of payment. Not so. The reaffirmation on which plaintiff relies is the Forms 10-K. 
Plaintiff admits, however, URI did not give it the Forms 10-K. The Complaint expressly pleads 
the Forms 10-K were not given to plaintiff. "Defendants have refused to provide plaintiff. . . 
any information . . . and plaintiff has been relegated to seeking out other sources for 
information." R. 18, f 75. The "other sources" include the Forms 10-K. R. 19, % 76. The 
Complaint further alleged "No Forms 10-K have even [sic] been given to plaintiff by any 
defendant." L£. at ^ 78. In its Opposing Memo, plaintiff reaffirmed URI did not give plaintiff the 
Forms 10-K: "Once again it should be remembered that plaintiff. . . never received any 
information from URI or its subsidiaries, including Tonaquint. Furthermore, plaintiff received 
nothing—no information . . . from the development partnerships . . . ." R. 177. See also, 
Affidavit of Joseph M. Newey, R. 245 ^ 13. Plaintiff reaffirms those statements on appeal. 
Appellant's Brief, at 19. The Plaintiff further admits it did not obtain and read the Forms 10-K 
until 1993. Plaintiff obtained the Forms 10-K from "third party sources" just "prior to drafting 
this complaint." Id- Plaintiff could not possibly have anticipated payments based on documents 
it did not see until 1993. There is no basis on which plaintiff could "continually reasonably 
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anticipate" payments for nearly twenty years. 
C. PLAINTIFF'S DELAY HAS MATERIALLY PREJUDICED DEFENDANTS. 
"[Statutes of limitations 'are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises 
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."' Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese. 
668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983)(footnote omitted). The prejudice caused by a plaintiffs delay 
is also the second element of laches. Leaver v. Grose. 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980). 
Plaintiffs delay will prejudice defendants. 
Plaintiff seeks an accounting spanning thirty-five years. Land has been sold, 
exchanged, repurchased and resold. R. 19-25, 31-38 ^ 82, 99, 100. URI has engaged in 
numerous, complex transactions with numerous unrelated individuals and entities involving 
millions of dollars. Id. Several general and limited partnerships have been formed to develop 
the land and improvements and operate businesses established on the land. Johnson v. Estate of 
Shelton. 754 P.2d 828, 831 (Mont. 1988) (The prejudice created by delay was improvements to 
and conveyance of the land.). Many individuals have died. Only one original Syndicate member 
is alive today. Evidence has been lost. Plaintiffs delay will make defense of its eighty-five page 
complaint inherently difficult. Callenders. Inc. v. Beckman. 120 Idaho 169, 814 P.2d 429, 435 
(Idaho App. Ct. 1991)(inherently difficult to defend against oral agreements made with former 
partner who was dead). The following statement in Leggroan highlights the injustice caused URI 
by plaintiffs delay. 
This case involves an excellent example of the type of stale claim statutes 
of limitation and laches are designed to prevent. Here the bank is required to 
account 16 years after the trust terminated and 10 years after final distribution. 
19 
During that period, the defendant testified that records and accounts had become 
lost, destroyed or were inaccessible. . . . The trust officer of defendant bank, who 
was the only party in the bank familiar with this trust and who had personal 
knowledge of its history and the transactions pertaining to it, had died. 
232 P.2d at 750. 
Plaintiff asserts three reasons why its delay has not prejudiced URL First, 
plaintiff argues one original syndicate member, Morgan, is alive. R. 179; Appellant's Brief, at 
18. That argument implies URI can defend plaintiffs Complaint based solely on Morgan's 
testimony and unreasonably presumes Morgan's memory over thirty-five years is perfect. 
Common sense dictates otherwise. In Lord v. Shaw. 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court refused to require the defense of a three or four year old claim. 
We think we would be placing an intolerable burden on the defendant to now, 
three and four years later, defend against the plaintiffs claims when the facts 
concerning how each dispute arose, what ensued and the extent of the injury to the 
plaintiff, if any, have been blurred by the passing of time. 
id. at 1291. In Lord, none of the witnesses were dead. 
Plaintiff simply ignores the deaths of ah other participants and principals and/or 
employees of the corporate participants who could have clarified the transactions alleged by 
plaintiff. The Complaint alleges an initial agreement in 1961 and several significant changes in 
that relationship from 1961 to 1975. R. 6-11. The Complaint is plaintiffs version of what 
happened. Plaintiff attempts to interpret the written documents and to reconstruct the numerous 
changes in the parties' relationship. Plaintiff even tries to attribute the legal significance to each 
transaction. Plaintiff, however, was not a party to those transactions. It was not present when 
each change in the relationship occurred. Plaintiff is merely an assignee of another assignee who 
received its assignment fifteen years after the original transaction and after all the subsequent 
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changes occurred. Without the parties who participated throughout that fifteen year period, the 
court will never know what really transpired. It would only be speculation. Furthermore, 
witnesses, who participated in, or had knowledge of plaintiff s acquisition of the assignment are 
dead. URI will be unable to rebut plaintiffs testimony regarding that assignment. 
Second, plaintiff argues "some" accounting records exist. R. 180; Appellant's 
Brief, at 18. That argument presumes all records created since 1961 exist and are possessed by 
URI. Plaintiffs argument also presumes the accounting is the sole issue in dispute. Plaintiff 
ignores any records created by the other participants which might clarify the nature and 
significance of the various transactions alleged by the Complaint. Plaintiff also ignores records 
created twenty years ago by other entities and individuals relating to B&E's alleged assignment. 
URI has never had custody of those records. The likelihood of all or even some of those 
documents being available is slim. 
Plaintiffs first two arguments also presume Morgan created and can authenticate 
and interpret all the records which can be found. Another unreasonable assumption. Witnesses 
who could have authenticated and interpreted those documents are dead. 
Finally, plaintiff argues it seeks only to recover profits, not title to Tonaquint's 
property. R. 180; Appellant's Brief, at 18. The character of plaintiff s intended recovery has no 
bearing on URI's prejudice. The crux of laches and limitations defenses is whether a claim may 
be pursued, regardless of its character, because of the prejudice caused by the delay in pursuing 
it. The answer in this case is no. 
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D. NO ACT OF URFS EXCUSED PLAINTIFFS DELAY. 
Essentially, plaintiff asserts two defenses which it contends excuses its delay.9 
First, plantiff contends the doctrine of estoppel should apply. Appellant's Brief, at 19-21. 
Second, plaintiff asserts URI acknowledged an obligation to plaintiff. Id. at 27-30. Both were 
correctly rejected by the trial court. 
1. Plaintiffs Delay Was Not Induced By URI. Plaintiff contends its delay is 
excused by the doctrine of estoppel because "clearly the actions of defendants misled Nilson-
Newey and disguised the beginning of the running of any rights against Nilson-Newey." R. 181; 
Appellant's Brief, at 19. Not only is plaintiffs contention not clear, but also it is incorrect. The 
elements in Utah to prove estoppel are indisputable. Utah appellate courts consistently require 
some form of inducement of or reliance by the party asserting estoppel.10 Triple I Supply. Inc. v. 
9In the trial court, plaintiff criticized URI's reliance on Leaver v. Grose for the proposition 
that it need only prove plaintiffs delay and URI's prejudice for laches. R. 172-73. Plaintiff 
argued Leaver was not "meant to limit this Court's analysis of all of the relevant factors." Id. 
Then, plaintiff asserted three additional elements. R. 185-87. Plaintiff asserts those same 
elements in its brief. Appellant's Brief, at 21-23. The language of Leaver is unmistakable. It 
states: "The availability of the defense of laches is contingent upon the establishment of two 
elements: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; and (2) an injury to defendant owing 
to such lack of diligence." 610 P.2d at 1264. Leaver does not require anything more. Plaintiff 
does not cite any Utah case which requires any other element. Every Utah case URI has found 
asserts only those two elements to prove laches. R. 273. 
10Ceco Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989)("Estoppel. 
. . requires proof of. . . reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to ac t . . . . " ) ; Blackhurst v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co.. 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985)("The elements of equitable estoppel 
are: 'conduct by one party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
action "); Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 
1979)("The elements essential to . . . estoppel are: (1) an admission, statement, or act. . . (2) 
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Sunset Rail. Inc.. 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982) is one example. In Triple I. the Utah Supreme 
Court held: "The doctrine of estoppel applies when one party knowingly induces another by 
some act or admission to take a detrimental course of action." Id. at 1302. Even plaintiff 
recognizes inducement or reliance is necessary. Plaintiff cites and quotes from several cases 
which require inducement or reliance: E.g.. Salmons v. Jameson. 144 Cal.App.2d 698, 301 P.2d 
431, 435 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956)(estoppel is applicable "where the delay in commencing 
action is induced by the conduct of the defendant. . . ."); South v. Wishard. 146 Cal.App.2d 276, 
303 P.2d 805, 814 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956)(Laches is not available if "the delay was induced 
by the fraud . . . ."); Duniwav v. Barton. 193 Or. 69, 237 P.2d 930, 937 (1951)("Delay induced 
by the fraud of the defendant is not laches."); Leaver v. Grose. 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 
1980)(estoppel applies when one "induces another to believe certain facts exist and such other 
relies thereon . . . ."). Appellant's Brief, at 20-21. 
Plaintiff has not pleaded, and cannot plead, inducement or reliance. The only 
source on which plaintiff relies for the claimed deception is the Forms 10-K. R. 181-82; 
Appellant's Brief, at 19-20. As previously stated, plaintiff admits URI did not give it the Forms 
action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act. . . ."); Van Per Heyde 
v. First Colony Life Insurance Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)("Estoppel. . . 
requires proof of. . . the other party's reasonable action or inaction that is based on the first 
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act. . . ."); Holland v. Career Service Review 
Board. 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)("The elements necesary to invoke equitable 
estoppel are . . . reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first 
party's statement, admission, act or failure to act. . . ."); Mendez v. State. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991)("[E]toppel is established by proof of. . . reasonable action or inaction by a 
second party, taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to ac t . . . 
."); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board. 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)("The 
elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are . . . reasonable action or inaction by the 
other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act. . . ."). 
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10-K. Supra, at 18. Plaintiff cannot prove URI "knowingly induced" plaintiffs delay if URI did 
not give the Forms 10-K to it. Not only did URI not give the Forms 10-K to plaintiff, but also 
plaintiff did not obtain or read the Forms 10-K until 1993. R. 19 H 78; R. 177, 245. Thus, 
plaintiff cannot prove it delayed filing its Complaint for twenty years in reliance on the Forms 
10-K when it did not obtain or read them until 1993. 
While trying to maintain the charade that it relied on the Forms 10-K, plaintiff 
really admits there was simply no communication between URI and plaintiff. Appellant's Brief, 
at 19. Without any communication, there cannot be an inducement. In Triple L the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's estoppel argument because "there had been no contact or 
communication between [defendant] and plaintiff. Without contact or communication of any 
kind, plaintiff could not have communicated or induced defendant into any type of detrimental 
conduct." 652 P.2d at 1302 (emphasis added). 
In reality, plaintiff asserts URI concealed certain facts from plaintiff through 
URI's silence. Appellant's Brief, at 20. Plaintiff suggests URI's silence somehow induced 
plaintiff s delay. Id. In Warren v. Provo Citv Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992\ the plaintiff 
made a similar concealment argument.11 The plaintiff did not rely on any affirmative 
representations, but argued the concealment version of the discovery rule applied because "he 
was prevented from discovering the cause of action because Provo did not return his phone 
calls." Id. at 1130. The Utah Supreme Court rejected that contention. It stated: 
While a party may be excused for failing to pursue a claim if the party acted in 
11
 URI previously cited Warren for the proposition that plaintiff failed to diligently 
investigate sources open to it. Supra, at 13. 
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reasonable reliance on a defendant's representations, absent any representations by 
the defendant, a plaintiff must take reasonable steps to prosecute the claim. 
Otherwise, there can be no showing that the defendant's actions prevented the 
discovery of the cause of action. 
Id. Because the plaintiff did not take reasonable steps to pursue his claim, the concealment 
version of the discovery rule did not apply. Id- Plaintiff cannot plead, or prove, any 
representations by URL Absent any such representations, plaintiff cannot prove URI prevented 
plaintiffs discovery of its claim and the concealment version of the discovery rule does not 
apply. Like the plaintiff in Warren, plaintiff knew where to obtain any information it wanted and 
failed to take reasonable steps to do so. Therefore, plaintiffs attempt to assert estoppel, or the 
concealment version of the discovery rule, also fails. 
2. There Is No Acknowledgment. Plaintiff claims URI acknowledged "an 
'existing liability, debt or claim'" as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1992). Appellant's 
Brief, at 27-30. Plaintiff relies on only two sources for the alleged acknowledgment: URI's 
Forms 10-K and Morgan's November 1993 letter, id. at 28-29. Neither is an acknowledgment. 
a. The Forms 10- K were not given to plaintiff. The Forms 10-K do not bar the 
trial court's application of the statutes of limitations because the Forms 10-K were not given to 
plaintiff.12 Weir v. Bauer. 286 P. 936 (Utah 1930) is dispositive.13 In Weir, the plaintiff argued 
an acknowledgment was made in the corporation's annual reports and income tax reports, among 
12As previously stated, plaintiff admits URI did not give the Forms 10-K to it. Supra, at 
18. 
1
 interestingly, plaintiff relied on Weir in support of its acknowledgment theory in the 
trial court. Opposing Memo, at 23. Now, plaintiff is trying to avoid Weir's application. 
Appellant's Brief, at 29. 
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other things, id. at 944. The Utah Supreme Court held neither was an acknowledgment because 
neither was given to the plaintiff. 
[W]e are inclined to the view that an acknowledgment made, not to a creditor or 
to his agent, or to one in privity with him, but to a stranger not intended to be 
communicated to a creditor or otherwise not intended to interrupt or remove the 
bar of the statute, or not made for such purpose, is not sufficient to constitute an 
acknowledgment interrupting or removing the bar. . . . The plaintiff testified that 
such reports were not received by him. The annual income tax reports . . . also, as 
we think, may not properly be regarded as an acknowledgment interrupting or 
removing the bar of the statute. Such reports were not made to be communicated 
to the plaintiff.. . . 
Id- at 945 (emphasis added and citation omitted). Weir not only states the general rule, but also 
the rule followed by nearly every jurisdiction addressing the issue. URI found cases in eighteen 
jurisdictions, other than Utah, which addressed the issue. Seventeen followed the rule as stated 
in Weir.14 Only one jurisdiction declined to follow the rule.15 
The primary reason for requiring that the acknowledgment be made to the 
creditor, or her agent, is an acknowledgment is essentially a contract. Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. 
14Root v. Thomas. 160 S.W.2d 46 (Ark. 1942); In re Miles' Estate. 72 Cal.App.2d 336, 
164 P.2d 546 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945); Heffelfinger v. Gibson. 290 A.2d 390 (D.C. 1972); 
Carnes v. Bank of Jonesboro. 198 S.E. 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938); Wingard v. Peters. 69 N.E. 908 
(111. App. Ct. 1946)(Abstract only); Bowen v. Lewis. 198 Kan. 605, 426 P.2d 238 (1967); 
Mellema's Administrator v. Whipple. 312 Ky. 13, 226 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950); Richard 
Guthrie & Associates v. Stone. 562 So.2d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Rickenbach v. Noecker 
Shipbuilding Co.. 66 N.J.Super. 580, 169 A.2d 730 (N.J. 1961); Essex Real Estate Corp. v. 
Piluso. 68 A.D.2d 923, 414 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Tankerslev v. Cooke. 206 
Okla. 418, 243 P.2d 722 (1952); Buell v. Deschutes County Municipal Improvement District. 
208 Or. 56, 298 P.2d 1000 (1956); McPhilomv v. Lister. 341 Pa. 250, 19 A.2d 143 (1941); 
Allied Chemical Corp. v. Koonce. 548 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Layman v. Layman. 
171 Va. 317, 198 S.E. 923 (Va. Ct. App. 1938); Reav.Rea. 19 Wash.App. 496, 576 P.2d 84 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978); Preston County Coke Co. v. Preston County Light and Power Co.. 146 
W.Va. 231, 119 S.E.2d 420 (1961). 
15Noldenv.Nolden. 1995 WL 10494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
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Shurtlif. 30 P.2d 733, 736-37 (Utah 1934). Like other contracts, an acknowledgment "implies a 
meeting of the minds " Tankersley v. Cooke. 243 P.2d 722, 724 (Okla. 1952)(quoting City 
of Fort Scott v. Hickman. 112 U.S. 150 (1884)). There cannot be a meeting of the minds, if the 
acknowledgment is not made to the creditor, or her agent. "[N]o privity is established with 
respect to the new promise," if the acknowledgment is made to a stranger. Addison v. Stafford. 
48 P.2d 202, 203 (Wash. 1935). An additional reason has been given for the rule. "[I]f the debt 
is acknowledged to him [the creditor or her agent], he may safely assume that the statute begins 
then to run, that a new period of limitation is agreed upon, and the debtor is estopped to deny it. 
. ." California College v. Stephens. 105 P. 614, 616 (Cal. 1909). Conversely, if the debt is not 
acknowledged to the creditor, "and he allows the statute to run, the creditor should be held to the 
consequences of his neglect to bring his action in time." Id. 
To avoid Weir, plaintiff argues the Forms 10-K were made "to the public" and 
"[n]otice to the public in that manner is deemed notice to the plaintiff." Appellant's Brief, at 28, 
30. Once again, Weir holds contrary. To avoid Weir, plaintiff argues the annual reports in Weir 
were not signed and were not made public, but the Forms 10-K in this case were signed and 
made available to the public. Appellant's Brief, at 29. The absence of a signature was only one 
factor on which the Utah Supreme Court relied. 286 P. at 945. The court also relied on the lack 
of delivery to the creditor. "The plaintiff testified that such reports were not received by him." 
Id- Furthermore, as plaintiff did in oral argument before the trial court,16 plaintiff completely 
failed to address the income tax reports referred to in Weir. The income tax reports were 
16See plaintiffs oral argument at R. 316-17. 
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"verified by Bauer, the president of the corporation, and signed by him for and on its behalf. . . ." 
286 P. 945. Although the Weir opinion does not expressly state the tax reports were filed with 
the I.R.S., that is the only logical inference. Thus, according to Weir, the filing of Forms 10-K 
with the S.E.C. is not delivery to plaintiff. 
In addition to plaintiffs failed attempt to distinguish Weir, plaintiff purports to 
support its argument (i.e., notice to the public is sufficient) with four cases.17 Plaintiff fails 
again. At least three of plaintiff s cases, Whale Harbor SPA. Inc. v. Wood. 266 F.2d 953 (5th 
Cir. 1959); Clarkson Company Limited v. Shaheen. 533 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); and 
Sebastion Enterprises. Inc. v. Florida First National Bank. 345 So.2d 827 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977), 
do not address or hold that publicly filed documents operate as an acknowledgment even though 
the documents were not delivered to the creditor. Those cases merely hold that a debt listed in a 
balance sheet or tax return can be an acknowledgment. Those cases are inapplicable for other 
reasons. 
Plaintiff stressed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' statement in Whale Harbor 
that its decision did not conflict with Weir. Appellant's Brief, at 30. Plaintiff, however, failed to 
explain why. The financial statements relied on in Whale Harbor were sent by the debtor to the 
creditor. "[A]t intervals of never more than six months, the bookkeeper of the corporation [the 
debtor], at the direction of Luckey, sent to Mrs. Wood [the creditor], or her agent, profit and loss 
17Appellant's Brief, at 30. Plaintiffs cases were not addressed in any pleadings filed in 
the trial court. Plaintiff waited until oral argument to spring its cases on URI and the Court. R. 
321. Because plaintiff did not provide copies of the cases to URI in advance, URI was unable to 
address them specifically during oral argument. URI briefly addressed the cases by letter to the 
Court after oral argument. R. 281-82. 
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statements and balance sheets of the corporation." 266 F.2d at 954 (emphasis added). That 
delivery complies precisely with the rule stated in Weir. 
The federal district court in Clarkson applied New York state law. New York 
follows the rule stated in Weir. In re Estate of SonnenthaL 39 Misc.2d 901, 242 N.Y.S.2d 135, 
138 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1936). The annual report in Clarkson was delivered to the creditor as required 
by New York law. In Clarkson. the plaintiff sought to collect certain assets to satisfy a judgment 
previously rendered in its favor. 533 F. Supp. at 908. One of those assets was a loan owed by 
Founders Corporation ("Founders") to Shaheen Natural Resources Co., Inc. ("SNR"). Id. at 931-
32. The boards of directors and business affairs of Founders and SNR were significantly 
intertwined. Id- at 909. When the plaintiff tried to garnish the debt, Founders claimed SNR 
failed to timely demand payment and commence an action to compel payment and therefore, 
plaintiff was barred, too. Id. at 932. The plaintiff argued Founders' listing of the debt in its 
annual report was an acknowledgment. The district court agreed. Founders, however, gave its 
annual report to SNR. Founders' annual report was signed by its president. Id. at 909, 931. 
Founders' president was also a director of SNR. Id. at 909. Thus, by signing Founders' annual 
report as its president and director, Founders' president also gave himself notice of the 
acknowledgment as SNR's director. 
The opinion in Sebastion Enterprises. Inc. v. Florida First National Bank. 345 
So.2d 827 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977) is sparse. It does not address the rule regarding delivery and the 
facts are incomplete. Sebastion. however, is now academic because of Nolden v. Nolden. 1995 
WL 10494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). In Nolden. the Florida District Court of Appeals held 
Florida's statute did not require delivery to the creditor. The majority opinion, including facts, is 
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half a page long and does not mention the general rule. Nolden is a split decision. A strenuous 
dissent is made, recognizing that the weight of modern authority is contrary to the majority 
opinion. The dissent also recognizes that the majority opinion relies on only two cases: Whale 
Harbor and Sebastian and it criticized reliance on those cases. In any event, Florida contradicts 
Utah and the overwhelming weight of modern authority. Pursuant to Weir, the 
acknowledgment, financial statement or otherwise, must be delivered to the creditor. Weir 
controls. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Consolidated Mortgage and Finance Corp.. 
691 F. Supp. 557 (D.P.R. 1988)("Consolidated II") is the only case cited by plaintiff which 
recognizes a "public acknowledgment" theory. Even that theory misses the mark here. In 
Consolidated II. the creditor sought to recover from a joint surety, not the principal debtor. An 
acknowledgment made by the debtor to the creditor had been previously adjudicated, id. at 562. 
In the prior case, the court found "Consolidated [the principal debtor] had acknowledged the 
debts through 'routinely and regularly' delivering notes to the bank [the creditor], 'numerous and 
repeated' requests for advances . . . and by 'repeatedly1 making partial payments . . . on the total 
balance owed." Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Consolidated Mortgage and Finance Corp.. 
805 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1986)("Consolidated I"). Thus, in Consolidated II. delivery to the 
creditor by the principal debtor was not an issue. When the joint surety asserted the statute of 
limitations defense, the FDIC argued the joint surety was bound by the principal debtor's 
acknowledgment. 691 F. Supp. at 559, 562. Thus, the critical issue in Consolidated II was 
whether or not the debtor's acknowledgment, which concededly had been made to the creditor, 
affected the liability of a joint surety. Id. at 562. 
30 
Relying on a Puerto Rican statute, the court decided the joint surety was bound. 
The statute states: "Interruption of the prescription against the principal debtor by suit for debt 
shall also lie against his surety: but that arising from extrajudicial claims of the creditor or 
private acknowledgments of the debtor shall not prejudice said surety." Id. at 562-63 (emphasis 
added). Under that statute, a debtor's surety is bound by the debtor's acknowledgment, unless the 
acknowledgment is made secretly. Id- at 563. The "public acknowledgment," recognized under 
Puerto Rican law, is intended to prevent collusion between the principal debtor and the creditor. 
Public acknowledgment of the debt enables the joint surety to discover the acknowledgment. 
Thus, the court held the principal debtor's financial statement, filed with the Commonwealth 
State Department, served as a public acknowledgment to the surety. Id. at 564. Consolidated II 
used the public acknowledgment to bind the joint surety, not to bar the principal debtor's use of 
the statute of limitations. 
In addition, the court held the surety had personally acknowledged the debt to the 
creditor. Id. at 565. The surety was also the president and director of the principal debtor. Id. at 
564. In its dual roles, the Surety regularly communicated with the creditor. 
"[H]e regularly and routinely signed notes . . . to the bank . . . . Suro also signed . . . 
various letters to Banco Credito . . . . Suro . . . signed the financial statement for 1977 
which disclosed the indebtedness. Suro . . . had the responsibility of reviewing and 
approving the request for advances submitted to the bank. . . . Suro knew by requesting 
further advances . . . after the expiration of the limitations period he was in a sense 
renewing as a joint surety his obligation to guarantee Consolidated's debt." 
Id. at 564-65. 
Consolidated II is inapplicable for another reason. The surety was liable under 
another Puerto Rican statute which states: "Interruption of prescription of actions in joint 
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obligations equally benefits or injures all the creditors or debtors." id. at 563. Under that statute, 
a surety who is jointly liable with the debtor is treated equally as a debtor and is bound by the 
principal debtor's acknowledgment. Id. at 565-66. Under Puerto Rican law, a surety who is 
jointly liable is a primary obligor, not just secondarily liable. Because the surety and debtor are 
equally liable, the court held the surety was bound by the debtor's acknowledgment. Id. 
Finally, it appears the Puerto Rico Supreme Court follows the rule stated in Weir. 
In Consolidated II. the court cites a Puerto Rico Supreme Court decision, Diaz De Diana v. 
A.I.A.S. Ins. Co.. 110 P.R.R. 471.]8 According to the United States District Court for the District 
of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held in Diaz that "acknowledgment which 
interrupts the statute of limitations must be made to the creditor . . . ." 691 F. Supp. at 563. 
Thus, to the extent the federal courts do not require delivery to the creditor, they may be 
misapplying Puerto Rican law. 
URI found fourteen cases in twelve jurisdictions, other than Weir and Utah, in 
which it was argued that a statement contained in a document publicly filed, but not given to the 
creditor, was an acknowledgment. In each case, the court held there was no acknowledgment 
because it had not been made to the creditor. One, Grass v. Eiker. 123 A.2d 613 (D.C. 1956), is 
directly on point. In Grass, the plaintiff asserted the defendant's report, filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission pursuant to its rules, was an acknowledgment. Id. at 614. The 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals said no. "We hold that the mere listing of the debts in the 
report to the Securities and Exchange Commission was not an acknowledgment sufficient to stop 
!URI tried to obtain a copy of this case, but was unsuccessful. 
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the running of the statute of limitations." Id. 
In four cases, the plaintiffs relied on the defendants' financial statements or federal 
tax returns: Rickenbach v. Noecker Shipbuilding Co.. 169 A.2d 730, 732-33 (N.J. 1961)(tax 
returns signed and filed with the I.R.S. were not an acknowledgment); Rea v. Rea. 576 P.2d 84, 
85-87 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)(fmancial statements, signed by debtor and given to his bank [not 
the creditor], were not an acknowledgment); Trethewey v. Green River Gorge. Inc.. 136 P.2d 
999, 1008, 1013 (Wash. 1943)(tax returns, signed and filed with the I.R.S., were not an 
acknowledgment); Preston County Coke Co. v. Preston County Light and Power Co.. 119 S.E.2d 
420, 426, 431 (W. Va. 1961)(a federal income tax return was not an acknowledgment). 
In seven cases, the plaintiffs relied on pleadings filed in a court: Roper v. Smith. 
187 P. 454, 455 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919)(petition filed with court); Mellema's Adminstrator v. 
Whipple. 226 S.W.2d 318, 320-21 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950)(verified petition filed with court); Masset 
v. Carver. 265 So.2d 456, 457-58 (La. Ct. App. 1972)(This case involved a divorce stipulation. 
The opinion is not clear, but it appears the stipulation may have been filed with the court.); Essex 
Real Estate Corp. v. Piluso. 414 N.Y.S.2d 377, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)(affidavit filed with 
court); Tankersley v. Cooke. 243 P.2d 722, 723-24 (Okla. 1952)(settlement agreement filed with 
court); Layman v. Layman. 198 S.E. 923, 925-26 (Va. Ct. App. 1938)(deposition given in 
lawsuit); Addison v. Stafford. 48 P.2d 202, 203 (Wash. 1935)(affidavits filed in divorce). 
In three cases, the plaintiffs relied on certain documents filed by the defendants 
with various governmental agencies: Bowen v. Lewis. 426 P.2d 238, 242-43 (Kan. 
1967)(collateral agreement with I.R.S.); Buell v. Deschutes County Municipal Improvement 
District. 298 P.2d 1000, 1001-02 (Or. 1956)(reports filed State Engineer, State Treasurer and 
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State Reclamation Commission); Preston County Coke Co. v. Preston County Light and Power 
Ca, 119 S.E.2d 420, 426, 431 (W. Va. 1961)(signed annual report filed with the Public Service 
Commission). 
Weir rejects plaintiffs public acknowledgment argument. At least twelve other 
jurisdictions also reject that argument. The underlying reasons for requiring direct delivery to 
the creditor are as applicable when the statements are made to a public entity as when they are 
not. Unless they are intended to reach the creditor, there is no acknowledgment. Weir controls 
this case. It mandates the Forms 10-K be given directly to plaintiff by URI to constitute an 
acknowledgment. They were not. There is no acknowledgment. 
b. Morgan's letter repudiates URTs obligation. URI is bemused by plaintiffs 
continued reliance on Morgan's November 1993 letter. In the Complaint and in its Opposing 
Memo in the trial court, plaintiff quoted only one sentence from Morgan's letter: "I have always 
said, Joe, that I felt the Company had a moral, and I felt, a legal obligation to you and Darrell." 
R. 40, 192. To create the impression Morgan was speaking for URI, plaintiff stated immediately 
after that quotation the letter was "signed by John H. Morgan, Jr. as Chairman and CEO of Utah 
Resources International. Inc." R. 192 (emphasis added). That identical quote and statement 
appear in plaintiffs appeal brief. Appellant's Brief, at 28-29. Even more incredible than 
plaintiffs continued reliance on Morgan's letter, is its failure to disclose to this court the 
paragraph in Morgan's letter which followed immediately after the quotation used by plaintiff. It 
reads: 
THESE DIRECTORS SAY THAT SO MUCH TIME HAS GONE BY, AND ALSO 
ARGUE THAT YOU ARE NOT THE ONES WHO ACTUALLY PUT UP THE 
MONEY, THAT THEY FEEL THERE IS NO LEGAL OR MORAL 
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OBLIGATION. 
R. 256 (emphasis added). Plaintiff also failed to disclose to this Court Morgan's July 1993 letter, 
in which he expressed the same position for URI: 
I TOOK THIS MATTER UP WITH THE PRESENT BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
AS I MENTIONED TO YOU THAT I WOULD DO. IT WAS THEIR VERY 
CLEAR OBSERVATION AND DECISION THAT WE HAD NO LEGAL 
OBLIGATION OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEVERAL REASONS, PROBABLY 
THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS THE TIME FACTOR 
PRECLUDING ANY OBLIGATIONS WHATSOEVER. 
R. 252 (emphasis added).19 Those letters expressly and unquestionably deny any liability for 
URI. Plaintiffs continued reliance on Morgan's letter borders on the frivolous. 
c. An acknowledgment must be a distinct, unequivocal admission fa 
subsisting debt. "[Something more than vague general expressions of a desire and purpose to 
pay money to another is necessary, and nothing short of a distinct, direct, and unequivocal 
admission of a present, subsisting liability is sufficient. Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Shurtliff. 30 
P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1934). An acknowledgment "must be more than a hint, a reference, or a 
discussion of an old debt. . . ." Id. The Utah Supreme Court approvingly quoted the United 
States Supreme Court: '"An acknowledgment. . . implies a meeting of the minds . . . .fM Id-
Morgan's November 1993 letter obviously does not meet Shurtliffs defintion of an 
acknowledgment. 
The language in the Forms 10-K also does not meet Shurtliffs definition. First, 
the Forms 10-K unequivocally deny any accrual of profits and any potential distribution of 
19Plaintiff also failed to disclose those statements to the trial court. Although Morgan's 
letters were attached as exhibits to Joseph M. Newey's affidavit, plaintiff failed to make any 
reference to the quoted statements in its memorandum or in oral argument. R. 191-93, 314-20. 
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profits. R. 26-30. Plaintiff concedes that point. Appellant's Brief, at 7. Second, in some 10-Ks, 
management made no statement regarding plaintiffs alleged interest. In others, URI's auditors 
stated: "They may be entitled only to a percentage of the profits . . . ." id. (emphasis added). In 
one year, URI's auditors stated: "Management believes, because there has been no profit from 
the operation of Tonaquint, Inc., as well as other reasons, that no liability for potential profit 
distributions existed . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Taken as a whole, the Forms 10-K are nothing 
more than a vague reference or discussion of an old transaction between S.W. Associates and its 
former members. The disclosure was made by URI pursuant to S.E.C. rules to avoid any 
possible Rule 10b-5 exposure. The Forms 10-K do not express an obligation on which minds 
could meet. They are not a distinct and unequivocal admission of a subsisting debt. 
E. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR AN ACCOUNTING EXPIRED IN 1981. 
Plaintiff seeks an accounting of the purported partnership. R. 48-50. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-40 (1953), a right to an accounting accrues when a partnership dissolves. 
URI raised section 48-1-40 in the trial court. R. 133. Plaintiff completely ignored section 48-1-
40. R. 190-91. Plaintiff continues to ignore that section. Appellant's Brief, at 27. Plaintiffs 
only response is the partnership has not dissolved. 
Assuming arguendo there was a partnership, it dissolved in 1975 when plaintiff 
acquired its assignment. By definition, any partnership must have more than one partner. Ld. §§ 
48-1-3, 48-2-1. When an event occurs leaving only one partner, the partnership dissolves by 
operation of law. Benton v. Albuquerque National Bank. 701 P.2d 1025, 1031 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1985). Benton entered into a written partnership agreement with Suber. Id. at 1028. Benton 
later assigned his partnership interest to the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff brought an 
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action to recover Benton's interest in the partnership assets. Id. at 1029. The court held the 
partnership dissolved when Benton assigned his partnership interest to the plaintiff. "Although 
an assignment does not itself dissolve the partnership, Section 54-1-27(A), a general partnership, 
in the absence of written provisions to the contrary, cannot exist with less than two members." 
id. at 1031. When plaintiff received its assignment in 1975, only one partner remained according 
to the Complaint. None of plaintiff s exhibits evidence a continuation of the purported 
partnership with only one partner. Thus, the purported partnership dissolved inl975, nearly 
twenty years ago. Assuming arguendo Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1992) applies, plaintiff had 
six years from 1975 to enforce its right to an accounting. Plaintiff is too late. 
F. THE FRAUD CLAIM IS BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-26(3), 
According to the Complaint, URI's statements regarding plaintiffs percentage of 
ownership were erroneous from "the time the calculation was first determined by defendants or 
their accountants." R. 31 H 90. The first written evidence of URI's calculations are dated 1981. 
R. 26-31 If 89. Plaintiff alleges, however, the fraud first occurred in 1975. R. 61 ^ 190(a). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (1992), plaintiff should have brought its fraud claim 
within three years after it discovered the alleged fraud. Plaintiff need not know every detail. 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In Koulis. Koulis and defendant executed a lease. Id. at 1183. Koulis died. 
Plaintiff, Koulis' heir, knew of the lease and lived on the property for seventeen years, but did not 
attempt to obtain a copy of the lease. Fourteen years later, when the defendant gave the plaintiff 
a copy, she determined the lease had been breached. In holding the plaintiff was too late, this 
court said she "could and should have requested copies of the lease." Id. at 1185. This court 
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further stated she "had all the facts necessary to ascertain the alleged fraud," but waited fourteen 
years to bring the claim. Id. (emphasis added). Like the plaintiff in Koulis. plaintiff "could and 
should have requested" an accounting from 1975 on. Plaintiff knew where to get an accounting. 
R. 12 ^  52. Plaintiff knew enough and had access to other information to ascertain the alleged 
fraud, but waited too long. 
G. PLAINTIFF'S CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST CLAIM IS TOO LATE. 
A constructive trust is imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. Parks v. Zions First 
National Bank. 673 P.2d 590, 599 (Utah 1983). The applicable limitation period for unjust 
enrichment is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992). The limitation period began to run when 
plaintiff "should have discovered the wrongful act which gave rise to the constructive trust." 
State v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co.. 694 P.2d 7, 12 (Wash. 1985). The alleged wrongful 
conduct occurred as early as 1970, and by at least 1978. Given plaintiffs knowledge and access 
to the county records and Forms 10-K, it should have discovered the wrongful conduct by at least 
1982 or 1983. Thus, plaintiff is too late. 
H. THE REMAINING CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-25(3). 
Plaintiffs remaining claims are barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992). 
Once again, assuming the applicability of a discovery rule, plaintiff should have asserted its 
remaining claims no later than within four years after 1978 or 1979. Plaintiffs claims are too 
late. 
I. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT DISPUTE WHICH STATUTES OF LIMITATION APPLY. 
In the trial court, URI identified each applicable statute of limitation and when 
each generally begins to run. R. 132-35. Plaintiffs 1st, 2d, 4th and 11th causes of action allege 
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an express or resulting trust, a general partnership or a contract. All are based on a written 
instrument. Thus, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2)( 1992) applies to those claims. The underlying 
claim is defendants breached the written trust, partnership or contract. The statute of limitation 
for breach of a written agreement accrues when the breach occurs unless the discovery rule 
applies. Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction Co.. 744 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Utah 
1987). If the discovery rule applies, the action must be filed within six years after the claim is 
discovered or should have been discovered, id. Plaintiffs 7th cause of action seeks an 
accounting of the purported partnership. R. 49-51. By statute, plaintiffs right to an accounting 
accrues when the partnership dissolves. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-40 (1953). The six year 
limitations period also applies to plaintiffs accounting claim. Plaintiffs 13th cause of action 
alleges fraud. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (1992) applies to that claim. Pursuant to Section 
78-12-26(3), plaintff should have filed its fraud claim within three years after it should have 
discovered the fraud. Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992) applies to plaintiffs other 
claims. Assuming the applicability of a discovery rule, plaintiff should have asserted its 
remaining claims within four years after plaintiff discovered the claims. Plaintiff did not dispute 
those statements in the trial court and has not challenged them on appeal. R. 187-94; Appellant's 
Brief, at 24-31. Any challenge now is too late. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF OWNS AN INTEREST OR STOCK IN A DEFUNCT ENTITY 
The Complaint expressly alleges plaintiff obtained an ownership interest in S.W. 
Associates, nothing more. The Syndicate Agreement, as amended, created an entity which 
became known as S.W. Associates. R. 7 If 21. B&E was a member of S.W. Associates. R. 6, 7 
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fflf 15, 21. In December 1972, B&E received a Certificate representing its ownership interest in 
S.W. Associates. R. 10 ^ j 40. The Certificate states: "This certifies that ***B&E Securities, 
Inc.*** is the owner of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE*** 
UNITS of S. W. Associates " R. 102. Paragraph 28 expressly alleges "plaintiff retains an 
interest" in S.W. Associates. R. 8. 
The Complaint expressly alleges B&E did not obtain an interest in URI or its 
predecessor. By 1970, all S.W. Associates' members, except B&E, opted out of S.W. Associates 
and received stock in URI. R. 9 f 32. B&E chose to retain its interest in S.W. Associates and 
did not accept stock in URI. Id. The Complaint does not allege B&E obtained an interest in 
Tonaquint or its predecessor and there is no allegation that S.W. Associates acquired any interest 
in URI, Tonaquint or their predecessors. 
S.W. Associates was effectively defunct by 1973. As stated, S.W. Associates had 
no member except B&E by 1970. S.W. Associates' only asset was land. R. 8 Tf 28. By 1973, 
S.W. Associates only asset was transferred to Tonaquint's predecessor. R. 9-10, 11 ffl[ 37-38, 42. 
There is no allegation that S.W. Associates retained any interest in that land. In 1973, S.W. 
Associates' only remaining member, B&E, gave up its entire interest in the land in favor of 
Tonaquint. R. 12, 92 % 50. Thus, by 1973, although B&E still possessed a Certificate in S.W. 
Associates, the entity had no assets and no business purpose. 
In 1975, B&E assigned the Certificate to American Holding Co. R. 12^51. The 
same day, American Holding Co. assigned the Certificate to plaintiff. Id. Plaintiffs claims, 
however, are based on the Disclaimer. R. 40-44,46-47, 58 tH 111-12,114, 119-20, 122, 127, 
131, 140, 142, 145, 179-80. There is no allegation that B&E assigned its interest in the 
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Disclaimer to American Holding Co. or plaintiff. It is fundamental that "an assignee takes 
nothing more by his assignment than his assignor had." Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co.. 608 P.2d 
236, 238 (Utah 1980). The Certificate merely entitled B&E to an ownership interest in S.W. 
Associates which was defunct. Plaintiffs assignment gave it no more than what B&E had. Thus, 
plaintiff owns worthless stock or an interest in a defunct entity and its assignment was a nullity. 
Laning v. National Ribbon & Carbon Paper Manufacturing Co.. 40 F. Supp. 1005, 1006 (N.D. 
111. 1941) aff d on other grounds. 125 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1942). The trial court correctly 
dismissed plaintiffs Complaint. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS REMAINING ISSUES WERE DECIDED CORRECTLY BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN URTS FAVOR 
Plaintiff addresses seven additional issues: 
1. Whether the business relationship among the parties is a trust. Appellant's 
Brief, at 2, 33-37. 
2. Whether the business relationship among the parties is a partnership, id. 
at 2,37-39. 
3. Whether plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity. Id. at 2, 39-42. 
4. Whether plaintiff failed to state a claim for fraud. Id. 
5. Whether the contract, trusts and partnerships are too indefinite to be 
enforced. Id. at 2, 42-45. 
6. Whether there is a partnership fiduciary duty. Id. at 2, 45-47. 
7. Whether certain of the allegations claimed by URI to be immaterial, 
impertinent and scandalous must be stricken. Id. at 2, 47-49. 
The trial court correctly decided each of those issues in URI's favor. URI thoroughly addressed 
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those issues in its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed in the trial court. R. 136-
52. The correctness of the trial court's decision regarding plaintiffs remaining issues can be 
resolved by reference to that memorandum. The relevant portions of URI's memorandum are 
incorporated into this brief. For the court's convenience, those portions are attached as follows: 





There is no general partnership 
Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with 
particularity 
Plaintiff failed to state a claim for fraud 













partnership are too indefinite to be 
enforced 
There is no partnership fiduciary duty R. 150-51 
7. Plaintiffs immaterial, impertinent and R. 151-52 




This case is a classic example of a stale claim. For thirty five years, URI 
expended a great deal of energy and substantial assets to develop the land in St. George. Since 
1961, plaintiff and its predecessors have watched that development take place, knowing it 
claimed an interest in the development and knowing no profits had ever been distributed to it. At 
all times, plaintiff knew where to obtain any information it wanted and it ignored what it knew. 
Now, after waiting until witnesses have died, memories have faded and evidence has been lost, 
plaintiff claims thirty five later it is entitled to millions of dollars. The trial court's order 
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dismissing plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice was correct. Thus, URI requests that this court 
affirm the trial court's decision. 
DATED: February 27, 1995 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
JeffreyJ&obix 
MaAW. M^ 
Attorneys for Utah Resources International, Inc., 
Tonaquint, Inc., Resources Limited Partnership, 
Tonaquint Indian Hills Limited Partnership, 
Country Club Partnership, Southgate Plaza Limited 
Partnership, Southgate Palms Limited Partnership, 
Southgate Resort Limited Partnership and Service 
Station Limited Partnership #2, defendants and 
appellees 
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Plaintiff's claims, however, are based on the Disclaimer, not the 
Certificate. The Complaint notes B&E refused to take stock in 
URI (f 32) , so the Certificate cannot be deemed to be a stock 
ownership interest in URI. At best, plaintiff owns worthless 
stock or an interest in a defunct entity, S.W. Associates and its 
assignment was a nullity. Laninq v. National Ribbon & Carbon 
Paper Manufacturing Co., 40 F. Supp. 1005, 1006 (N.D.* 111. 1941) 
aff'd on other grounds, 125 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1942). 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S TRUST CLAIMS FAIL 
A. There is no express trust* 
The Complaint alleges the Disclaimer created an express 
trust with Tonaquint as the trustee and plaintiff the 
beneficiary. Complaint, 55 112, 114. "The essential elements of 
a trust are a competent settlor and a trustee, clear and 
unequivocal intent to create a trust, ascertainable trust res, 
and sufficiently identifiable beneficiaries.11 Golleher v. 
Horton, 715 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). See also, 
Parks v. Zions First National bank, 673 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah 
1983); Sundguist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1981). 
The Disclaimer does not express any intent to create a trust. 
Nor does it identify a trustee or the beneficiaries. In fact, 
the only language designating a beneficiary identifies Tonaquint, 
not plaintiff. Complaint, Exhibit D. The Disclaimer does not 
express Tonaquint's consent to act as trustee which is mandatory. 
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G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trust, at 100 
(5th ed. 1973). There is no res. Plaintiff alleges the trust 
res is the 906 acres. Complaint, f 115. B&E, however, 
disclaimed "any and all right, title and interest" in the land. 
Id. Exhibit D. To retain any interest in the land, B&E had to 
expressly reserve that interest in the Disclaimer. Romain v. 
Earl Schwartz Co., 779 P.2d 54, 56 (Mont. 1989). See also, Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-3 (1990). There is no such language. B&E gave 
up its interest in the land in exchange for Tonaquint's promise 
of some unidentifiable profits in the future. Thus, when the 
Disclaimer was executed, there was no res. The Disclaimer does 
not create an express trust. 
B. There is no resulting trust. 
Plaintiff claims alternatively the Disclaimer created a 
resulting trust. Id. <JI 120. A resulting trust is an implied 
trust. Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Matter of Estate of Burns, 585 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1978). Some courts have restricted resulting trusts to 
three situations: 
N(a) The failure of an express trust; (b) the full 
performance of an express trust without exhausting the trust 
estate; and (c) the payment of the purchase price of 
property by one who directs that title be taken in the name 
of another.' 
Mattes, 759 P.2d at 1181. Although Utah has not adopted or 
rejected that approach, one court of appeals judge has indicated 
his inclination to broaden the application of resulting trusts. 
He would apply a resulting trust "Wherever the circumstances 
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surrounding the disposition of property raise an inference, not 
rebutted, that the transferor does not intend that the person 
taking or holding the property, or a third person, should have 
the beneficial interest therein." id. at 1181-82. Even if the 
broader approach were applied, the Disclaimer does not create a 
resulting trust. There is no express trust. So, the first two 
situations do not apply. The third situation and the broader 
application are essentially the same. In this case, B&E gave up 
"any and all" its interest in the alleged res through the 
Disclaimer. Supra, at 16. Thus, there is no resulting trust. 
C. The Constructive trust is time barred, 
A constructive trust is imposed to prevent unjust 
enrichment. Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 
599 (Utah 1983). The applicable limitation period for unjust 
enrichment is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992) . The limitation 
period began to run when plaintiff "should have discovered the 
wrongful act which gave rise to the constructive trust." State 
v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 694 P.2d 7, 12 (Wash. 1985). 
The alleged wrongful conduct occurred as early as 1970, and by at 
least 1978. Supra, at 13. Given plaintiff's knowledge, it 
should have discovered the wrongful conduct by at least 1982 or 
1983. Supra, at 5-7, 9-10. Thus, plaintiff is too late. 
D. There is no constructive trust. 
A constructive trust must also have a res. United 
States v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031, 1040 (Wyo. 1985). B&E gave up 
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all its interest in the alleged res through the Disclaimer. 
Supra, at 16. Thus, there is no constructive trust. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF'S PARTNERSHIP CLAIMS FAIL 
A
* Plaintiff's predecessor was not a limited partner. 
Plaintiff alleges it became a limited partner as "a 
result of the Amendment of Syndicate Agreement [and] the 
Disclaimer . . . . Id. fl 134. Plaintiff's reference to the 
Amendment is significant. It is the only document expressing any 
limitation of liability. Thus, absent some connection with the 
Amendment, plaintiff cannot be a limited partner. B&E did not 
sign the Amendment. Id. f 23, Exhibit B. B&E never became a 
party to the Amendment. The Disclaimer does not express any 
limitation of liability. It does not refer to or incorporate the 
terms of the Amendment. It does not admit B&E as an additional 
limited partner. B&E did not assign a limited partnership 
interest to plaintiff, because it was never a party to the 
Amendment. 
B. A limited partnership was not created, 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-1 (1953) defines a limited 
partnership as "a partnership formed by two or more persons under 
the provisions of [Section 48-2-2(1)], having as members one or 
more general partners and one or more limited partners. . . ." 
Section 48-2-2(1), mandates how a limited partnership is formed. 
Two or more persons must sign and swear to a certificate which 
must contain reference to fourteen elements. Rond v. Yeaman-
18 
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Assuming plaintiff is relying on the Amendment, the 
claim fails. Neither Tonaquint nor URI were parties to the 
agreement. Under the Amendment, only Morgan, Jr. could be 
construed as the general partner. Assuming plaintiff is relying 
on the Disclaimer, the claim fails, too. The Disclaimer says 
nothing about a limitation of liability. Thus, the plaintiff 
cannot rely on the Disclaimer alone, but must tie it to the 
Amendment. The Disclaimer, however, does not refer to the 
Amendment. It does not express a continuation of the purported 
limited partnership created by the Amendment. It does not 
subsitute URI or Tonaquint as a general or limited partner in 
that partnership. The Complaint does not allege, and the 
Disclaimer does not reflect Tonaquint's or URI's consent to act 
as general partner. That consent is essential. See Beckerman 
v. Sands, 364 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
D. A general partnership was not created. 
Once again, the exact basis for creating a general 
partnership between URI and Tonaquint, and plaintiff is not 
clear. Assuming the Syndicate Agreement initially created a 
general partnership, URI and Tonaquint were not parties to the 
that agreement and its Amendment. Thus, they are not parties to 
the purported general partnership arising from those instruments 
unless they were later admitted. 
Plaintiff attempts to allege URI was later substituted 
as a partner when the Salt Lake Group exchanged its interest for 
stock in URI. Complaint, f 141. That exchange is insufficient 
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to effect a substitution. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-24 
(1953), the other partners had to agree. Absent that agreement, 
URI became merely an assignee without rights as a partner. The 
Complaint does not allege any such agreement. None of the 
Complaint's exhibits reflect any agreement to substitute URI as a 
partner. Furthermore, the Complaint does not allege, and its 
exhibits do not reflect URI's consent to act as "managing" 
partner. 
Tonaguint never received an interest in the purported 
general partnership created by the Syndicate Agreement. The 
Complaint does not allege, and its exhibits do not reflect any 
assignment of URI's interest in the partnership to Tonaquint. 
The Disclaimer, the only document signed by Tonaquint, does not 
continue the entity formed under the Syndicate Agreement and does 
not admit Tonaquint to that purported partnership. The 
Disclaimer is, at most, a new deal between Tonaquint and B&E. 
The Disclaimer, however, does not create a general 
partnership between Tonaquint and B&E. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 
(1953) defines a partnership as "an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profits." Among 
other things, "[t]here must be joint proprietary interest and a 
right of mutual control over the subject matter of the enterprise 
or over the property engaged therein" to establish a partnership. 
Bender v. Bender, 397 P.2d 957, 962 (Mont. 1965). See also, 
Cusick v. Phillippi, 709 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1985) . Under the Disclaimer, there was no "joint proprietary 
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interest" or "right of mutual control." The Complaint alleges 
the partnership's property consisted of 906 acres and additional 
land. Complaint, 5 146. Pursuant to the Disclaimer, however, 
B&E gave up "any and all right, title and interest" in the land. 
Id. Exhibit D. The Disclaimer does not reserve any right in 
plaintiff, or B&E, to jointly own or control the land's 
disposition. The Complaint does not allege, and its exhibits do 
not reflect, the transfer of any land to Tonaguint and plaintiff, 
or B&E, to be held jointly by them. The Complaint alleges 
Tonaquint has had exclusive control over the land and its 
disposition since the Disclaimer was signed. Thus, there is no 
general partnership. 
E. Plaintiff was merely an assignee, not a partner.. 
Plaintiff was not a party to the original written 
instruments. Ici. J[5[ 15, 23, 40, 42, Exhibits A, B, D, E. 
Plaintiff has not contributed any asset to the purported 
partnership. Id. 5 15. Plaintiff acquired its assignment from 
B&E's assignee. Id. 
Assuming arguendo the existence of a general or limited 
partnership, plaintiff was not a partner. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 48-1-24 and 48-2-19 (1953), plaintiff is only an assignee 
with no rights as a partner. Section 48-1-24 is titled 
"Assignment of partner's interest" and states: 
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the 
partnership does not . . . as against the other partners in 
the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee during the 
continuance of the partnership to interfere in the 
management or administration of the partnership business or 
affairs, or to require any information or account of 
22 
u:4J 
partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership 
books; but it merely entitles the assignee to receive in 
accordance with his contract the profits to which the 
assigning partner would otherwise be entitled. 
Section 48-2-19 imposes the same restrictions on the assignee of 
a limited partnership interest. Under both sections, an assignee 
only becomes a partner if the remaining partners agree or the 
written partnership agreement gives the assignee that right. 
The Complaint does not allege any agreement to accept 
plaintiff as a substituted partner. To be a partner, plaintiff 
relies on the Disclaimer and Amendment. Complaint, 5K 134, 145. 
Neither addresses the substitution of assignees as partners. 
Thus, when plaintiff acquired its assignment in 1975, it acquired 
only the right to receive what B&E was entitled to. That right 
accrued only upon dissolution of the purported partnership. Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-1-24 (1953). Prior to dissolution, the assignee 
has no right to interfere in any way, including demanding an 
accounting. £d. Thus, if a partnership exists, plaintiff is not 
entitled to an accounting as requested in the 7th cause of action 
(55 157-62). That claim must also be dismissed. 
F. The purported partnership dissolved in 1975. 
Assuming a partnership was created by the Disclaimer, 
it dissolved in 1975 when plaintiff received its assignment. 
Supra, at 12. Thus, it no longer exists. Plaintiff should have 
asserted its alleged rights then. It is now too late. 




PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY 
Plaintiff's 13th cause of action attempts to allege 
fraud. Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"In all averments of fraud • . . the circumstances constituting 
fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity." General 
accusations of fraud are insufficient. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 
P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1962). "The basic facts must be set forth 
with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to 
constitute such charges." Id. The Honorable David K. Winder 
wrote Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(identical to Utah's rule) requires specific allegations of "how, 
when and where each defendant actually committed fraud or 
participated in the alleged fraudulent scheme." Cook v. Zions 
First National Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. Utah 1986). 
The fraud claim is deficient in several ways. Although 
it alleges certain statements were made to the plaintiff, a 
partnership, it fails to specify the plaintiff's agents to whom 
statements were made and from whom material facts were withheld. 
In fact, earlier in the Complaint, plaintiff inconsistently 
alleges the statements and omissions were not made to it. 
Complaint, 5 78. Although the fraud claim makes general 
conclusory allegations that Morgan, Jr., URI and Tonaquint made 
statements and withheld facts, it fails to specify which 
statements were made by each and which facts were withheld by 
each. It also fails to specify defendants7 agents who made the 
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statements and withheld the facts. It fails to specify when the 
statements and omissions were made. It fails to allege the 
statements were false, how they were false and how the statements 
or omissions were material. Because of plaintiff's lack of 
specificity, defendants are unable to prepare an adequate 
defense. Thus, the Court should dismiss the fraud claim. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR FRAUD 
Plaintiff's claim fails to properly plead fraud. A 
properly pleaded fraud claim includes nine elements: 
(1) a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either 
(a) knew was false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952). Plaintiff 
must plead all nine. The absence of any one is fatal. 
Plaintiff's claim omits at least six elements. 
A
- Plaintiff failed to allege, and cannot allege/ the alleged 
statements and omissions were made to induce plaintiff. 
The most damning deficiency is the absence of any 
intent to induce plaintiff to act or not to act. The fraud clair 
is devoid of any such allegation. The Complaint explains why and 
proves plaintiff's inability to make the allegation. 
jr meswpJi mi c* O 
^ 'J J U r, 
TabD 
statements and withheld the facts. It fails to specify when the 
statements and omissions were made. It fails to allege the 
statements were false, how they were false and how the statements 
or omissions were material. Because of plaintiff's lack of 
specificity, defendants are unable to prepare an adequate 
defense. Thus, the Court should dismiss the fraud claim. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR FRAUD 
Plaintiff's claim fails to properly plead fraud. A 
properly pleaded fraud claim includes nine elements: 
(1) a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either 
(a) knew was false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952). Plaintiff 
must plead all nine. The absence of any one is fatal. 
Plaintiff's claim omits at least six elements. 
A. Plaintiff failed to allege, and cannot allege, the alleged 
statements and omissions were made to induce plaintiff. 
The most damning deficiency is the absence of any 
intent to induce plaintiff to act or not to act. The fraud claim 
is devoid of any such allegation. The Complaint explains why and 
proves plaintiff's inability to make the allegation. 
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Apparently, the source of the statements and omissions 
are URI's Forms 10-K and the County Recorder's records. Without 
specifying the statements and omissions, paragraph 190 frequently 
refers to the "Facts and Background1' for more detail. The only 
allegations which could possibly relate to paragraph 190 are 
those reciting information from the Forms 10-K and the County 
Recorder's records. Complaint, 55, 79, 81-84, 86-95, 99. 
Defendants did not give the Forms 10-K or the County 
Recorder's records to plaintiff. Id. 75, 78. Plaintiff obtained 
the Forms 10-K and County Recorder's records from third parties. 
Id. 75-76, 78, 92. Not only was there no intent to induce 
plaintiff's action or inaction, but also the alleged statements 
and omissions were not made to plaintiff at all. Plaintiff's 
fraud claim must be dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Plaintiff cannot allege reliance or inducement. 
Also conspicuously absent is any allegation that 
plaintiff relied on and was induced to act or not to act. 
Complaint, f 189-93. Plaintiff did not rely on the alleged 
statements and omissions when it acquired its alleged assignment. 
Plaintiff did not acquire the assignment from defendants. Id. ^5 
16, 51. According to the Complaint, all statements and omissions 
were made to plaintiff after it acquired its assignment. Id. fft 
52, 53, 190. Thus, plaintiff cannot allege it relied on the 
statements and omissions to acquire its assignment. 
Paragraph 192(a) is plaintiff's best attempt at 
alleging reliance and it is insufficient. It states: 
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192. As a result of the actions of the specified 
defendants, plaintiff has been damaged in at least the 
following particulars: 
a. Through the years the plaintiff has been 
methodically seduced into not making further inquire or 
demand of the defendants. 
Although the primary focus is plaintiff's damage, it suggests 
plaintiff failed to protect its assignment because of defendants' 
statements and omissions. Plaintiff cannot genuinely claim such 
reliance. The source of defendants' statements and omissions is 
the Forms 10-K filed with the SEC since 1981. Defendants never 
submitted the Forms 10-K to plaintiff. Supra, at 26. According 
to the Complaint, plaintiff first became aware of defendants' 
alleged misconduct in 1993. Complaint, 55 175, 191. The only 
logical inference to be drawn from those allegations is plaintiff 
obtained the Forms 10-K to investigate its claims at that time. 
Not having read the Forms 10-K until 1993 or 1994, plaintiff 
cannot now claim it relied on them from 1975 to now and was 
induced by them to act or not to act. 
C. Any alleged reliance was not reasonable. 
Assuming defendants had submitted the Forms 10-K and 
county recorder's records to plaintiff, its own allegations 
highlight it could not have reasonably relied on the statements 
in those records. Plaintiff alleges the Forms 10-K and the 
county recorder's records contradict each other. Id. 55 79-80, 
93. Plaintiff alleges the county's records reflect significant 
activity with the land while the Forms 10-K report there have 
been no profits to be distributed. Compare 55 88-89 with 55 92 
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and 99. Even the statements in the Forms 10-K contradict each 
other. The Forms 10-K report profits from the land sales and 
exchanges, but then report there have been no profits to 
distribute to plaintiff. Compare 55 82-86 with 55 88-89. With 
the sources contradicting one another over a long period of time, 
and reliance by plaintiff could not have been reasonable. 
D. Plaintiff failed to allege defendants' statements were 
knowingly or recklessly false. 
The fraud claim is also devoid of any allegation that 
defendants7 statements were false. Plaintiff alleges three 
statements: 
1. Morgan, Jr. told plaintiff it only had an 8.9% 
interest; 
2. Morgan, Jr., URI and Tonaquint told plaintiff its 
8.9% interest declined; and 
3. no profits accrued. 
Id. 5 190(a), (b) and (c). Not only does plaintiff fail to 
allege those statements were false, but also paragraph 191 
contradicts any such accusation. Plaintiff alleges the 
fraudulent conduct "might be occurring," not that it did occur. 
Id. 5 191 (emphasis added). The failure to allege the statements 
are false is fatal. 
Nor does plaintiff allege defendants knowingly or 
recklessly made the statements and omissions. Another fatal 
flaw. Plaintiff alleges only that defendants' statements are 
based on erroneous information. 
Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the 
^percentage of profits' figure (beginning at 8% and now 
being reflected as from 3-5%) is based upon erroneous 
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data and calculations and does not reflect an accurate 
accounting of the relative interests of the parties at 
the time the calculation was first determined by 
defendants or their accountants. 
Id. 5 90 (emphasis added). Erroneous means "mistake," not 
knowing or reckless conduct. If plaintiff's Complaint is taken 
as true, its own allegations defeat the fraud claim. 
POINT VIII 
THE ALLEGED CONTRACT, TRUSTS AND PARTNERSHIPS ARE TOO 
INDEFINITE TO BE ENFORCED 
The Disclaimer forms the basis of the alleged contract, 
trusts and partnerships. Id. flf 112, 120, 131, 142, 179. To 
enforce either relationship, the terms of the respective 
relationship must be definite. "It is generally held that in 
order to be a binding contract the minds of the parties must have 
arrived at a sufficiently definite understanding as to terms that 
the parties know what they are bound to do." EFCO Distributing, 
Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615, 616 (Utah 1966). See also, Pinqree 
v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 
1976). "A partnership is essentially a contractual relation." 
59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership 96 (1987). See also, Beckerman v. 
Sands, 364 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)("[A] partnership 
is a contract."). As such, partnership agreements must also be 
sufficiently definite to be enforced. Willman v. Beheler, 499 
S.W.2d 770, 779 (Mo. 1973.) Trusts are subject to the same 
requirement. Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 
1981); Paqano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975); G.G. 
Bogert & G.T. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trust at 72 (5th ed. 
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data and calculations and does not reflect an accurate 
accounting of the relative interests of the parties at 
the time the calculation was first determined by 
defendants or their accountants. 
Id. 5 90 (emphasis added). Erroneous means "mistake," not 
knowing or reckless conduct. If plaintiff's Complaint is taken 
as true, its own allegations defeat the fraud claim. 
POINT VIII 
THE ALLEGED CONTRACT, TRUSTS AND PARTNERSHIPS ARE TOO 
INDEFINITE TO BE ENFORCED 
The Disclaimer forms the basis of the alleged contract, 
trusts and partnerships. Id. 55 112, 120, 131, 142, 179. To 
enforce either relationship, the terms of the respective 
relationship must be definite. "It is generally held that in 
order to be a binding contract the minds of the parties must have 
arrived at a sufficiently definite understanding as to terms that 
the parties know what they are bound to do." EFCO Distributing, 
Inc. v. Perrinf 412 P.2d 615, 616 (Utah 1966). See also, Pingree 
v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 
1976). "A partnership is essentially a contractual relation." 
59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership 96 (1987). See also, Beckerman v. 
Sands, 364 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)("[A] partnership 
is a contract."). As such, partnership agreements must also be 
sufficiently definite to be enforced. Willman v. Beheler, 499 
S.W.2d 770, 779 (Mo. 1973.) Trusts are subject to the same 
requirement. Sundguist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 
1981); Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975); G.G. 
Bogert & G.T. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trust at 72 (5th ed. 
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1973)("An indefinite or uncertain trust res is as fatal to the 
trust as no subject-matter whatever."). 
Regardless of the legal characterization, the 
Disclaimer's terms are too indefinite to be enforced. Defendants 
cannot determine from the controlling documents "what they are 
bound to do." Plaintiff's primary complaint is defendants had an 
obligation to distribute profits to plaintiff. Complaint, «;<! 
166(c), 171(c), 182-83, 185. The Disclaimer does not define 
"profits" or provide a formula by which "profits" can be 
calculated. Nor does the Disclaimer specify when or how often 
"profits" must be distributed. The timing and frequency with 
which profits are distributed would greatly affect the 
calculation of profits. Monthly and annual distributions would 
differ greatly from distributions intended only upon termination 
of the relationship. The Disclaimer does not specify what 
expenses are to be deducted before distributing "profits." It 
does not address the effect additional contributions by one party 
has on another's percentage of the profits. It does not specify 
how the land is to be valued in calculating profits. That will 
affect profits substantially in land exchange transactions versus 
cash sales. The term of the relationship is not expressed. 
Plaintiff advocates a perpetual relationship (35 so far years, 
during 15 of which it was not involved) without end except for 
its demand that it be dissolved now. 
In two cases, the term "profits" was too indefinite to 
form an enforceable contract. In Gregory v. Perdue, Inc., 267 
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S.E.2d 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980), plaintiff alleged a contract by 
which he agreed to grow chickens in exchange for defendants7 
promise to pay plaintiff a "minimum profit." Id. at 586. 
Defendant moved for summary judgment alleging the agreement was 
too indefinite to enforce. Summary judgment was granted and 
affirmed. Id. 
In Atkinson v. Atkinson, 33 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 1945), the 
court also refused to enforce an agreement to pay "profits." The 
plaintiff became financially distressed. .Id. at 669. 
Plaintiff's brother offered to pay his financial obligations in 
exchange for conveyance of the assets. Among other things, the 
brother offered: 
For this you shall have 1/2 the net proceeds of the farm, 
mill, etc., each year. If the lumber can be sold you can 
come supt. sell, etc., having 1/2 the profits. . . . Further 
you may purchase the entire place mill & all any time you 
can & wish with a reasonable profit. 
Id. The parties agreed. Id. at 670. The brother died and 
plaintiff demanded the brother's wife return the property and 
account for profits. When she refused, plaintiff sued asking 
that a constructive trust be imposed. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court's directed verdict against plaintiff. Id. at 670, 675. 
Among other things, the court held the brother's promises to pay 
"profits" was too indefinite and could not be enforced. 
"Certainly, neither the plaintiff herein nor this Court could 
determine what was a reasonable profit, nor from any phraseology 
employed in the instrument, upon what that profit must be 
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computed. The Court cannot make a contract for the parties." 
Id. at 674. Like Gregory and Atkinson, the term profits in the 
Disclaimer cannot be defined and therefore the obligation to pay 
profits cannot be enforced. 
POINT IX 
THERE IS NO PARTNERSHIP FIDUCIARY DUTY 
The 6th cause of action seeks a declaratory judgment 
that defendants owe plaintiff a fiduciary duty as a partner and 
the 9th cause of action alleges a breach of that fiduciary duty. 
Ordinarily partners owe each other a fiduciary duty. However, 
"when a relationship involving partners becomes adversarial and 
the partners deal at arm's length, their fiduciary duties to one 
another may be extinguished. !f Onq International Inc. v. 11th 
Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 454 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, the 
partners7 fiduciary relationship terminates when the partnership 
dissolves. Babray v. Carlino, 276 N.E.2d 435, 442 (111. App. Ct. 
1971). That is presumably because once dissolved the parties 
deal at arms length in winding up the partnership. See Id. 
(!l[T]he relationship between these parties, when their agreement 
for dissolution was consummated, was not fiduciary in nature but 
they dealt with each other at arms length.f!). 
Plaintiff's relationship is further removed than that 
of a partner. As stated, plaintiff is not a partner, but merely 
an assignee. As such, defendants did not owe plaintiff a 
fiduciary duty. In Kellis v. Ring, 155 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1979), the court refused to recognize a fiduciary 
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relationship between a general partner and an assignee. Id. at 
299-300. In Kellis, the assignee asserted a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim. Id. at 298. Relying on a statute nearly identical 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-24 and 48-2-19 (1953), the appellate 
court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's fiduciary duty claim. 
We agree with respondent that section 15519 limits the 
rights of assignees of limited partners who are not 
substituted limited partners. While appellant has aright to 
receive %the share of the profits or other compensation by 
way of income, or the return of his contributions to which 
his assignor would otherwise be entitled,' he has no right 
to interfere in the management of the limited partnership. 
Viewed forthrightly, substantively and apart from the 
niceties of pleading and form it is clear that appellant 
seeks to interfere in the management of the limited 
partnership totally contrary to the statutory provisions. 
Any other construction of section 15519 would thwart 
the legitimate purposes of the statutory scheme. Those 
purposes are based on the fact that limited partners 
themselves have only circumscribed opportunities to inquire 
into or challenge the management of the partnership, for 
reasons associated with the very nature of the limited 
partnership relation. Even greater restrictions are 
understandable for one who is involved only as an assignee 
of that interest . . . . 
Id. at 299-300. Plaintiff's fiduciary duty claims must be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
POINT X 
PLAINTIFF'S IMMATERIAL, IMPERTINENT AND SCANDALOUS 
ALLEGATIONS MUST BE STRICKEN 
Pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "the court may order stricken from any pleading . . . 
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." 
The Complaint refers to two previous lawsuits initiated against 
some of the defendants. Complaint, flfl 57-66, 68-74, 96-97, 175, 
191. Paragraphs 60, 61 and 62 state the court found and 
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concluded Morgan, Jr. defrauded the plaintiffs in the 1984 
Litigation and breached his fiduciary duty to them. Apparently, 
plaintiff quoted from findings and conclusions only proposed in 
the 1984 Litigation.4 An advisory jury returned a verdict of no 
cause of action on all claims it considered. Judge Noel never 
entered findings or conclusions. Plaintiff could have learned 
the true status of the 1984 Litigation by simply reviewing the 
docket sheet. Paragraphs 60, 61 and 62 are impertinent, 
scandalous and false. They must be stricken. 
Even assuming paragraphs 60-62 were true, plaintiff's 
reference to the two actions is immaterial. Plaintiff does not 
allege the 1984 and 1987 Litigation involved the subject matter 
of this Complaint. In fact, The Complaint gives no explanation 
of their relevance. One can only guess. Apparently, plaintiff 
seeks to impose guilt by association or to embarrass defendants. 
Neither purpose is relevant. The lawsuits could not possibly be 
admissible at trial. Regardless of plaintiff's intent, the 
allegations are not relevant, result only in embarrassment to 
defendants and must be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
From 1961 to now, defendants expended a great deal of 
energy and substantial assets to develop the St. George land. 
For 15 years, B&E did nothing to contribute to that development 
other than its very small initial payment. For another 2 0 years, 
4This Court can take judicial notice of its records which 
show those allegations are false. 
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